[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$fpNU_EhdnCWJ4oWLqylVH2dyX7h8PVrCoMXJP10xcWdA":3},{"article":4,"iocs":55,"watch_terms":59,"solutions":60,"lesson":63},{"id":5,"title":6,"slug":7,"summary":8,"ai_summary":9,"brief":10,"url":11,"image_url":12,"published_at":13,"ingested_at":14,"relevance_score":15,"entities":16,"category_id":32,"category":33,"article_tags":37},"3b3b1910-426d-4622-b03b-3ae2b7671c81","Mt. Gox – The Missing Bitcoin and Who Was Convicted of What","mt-gox-the-missing-bitcoin-and-who-was-convicted-of-what-5f2609","Mt. Gox said in 2014 that about 850,000 bitcoins had disappeared. What the courts found, who was charged, and how far repayments had got by October 2026.","In 2014, the Mt. Gox bitcoin exchange reported the disappearance of approximately 850,000 bitcoins. While its former boss, Mark Karpelès, was convicted of falsifying records, no one has been convicted of the theft itself. US prosecutors in 2023 charged two Russian nationals with conspiring to launder bitcoins from a 2011 hack, and Alexander Vinnik pleaded guilty in the US to a laundering conspiracy related to the BTC-e exchange. Repayments to creditors began in July 2024, with the deadline for completion extended to October 2027.","Mt. Gox exchange lost 850,000 bitcoins in 2014; convictions for falsifying records and money laundering, not theft.","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.darknet.org.uk\u002F2026\u002F11\u002Fmt-gox-hack-karpeles-vinnik\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.darknet.org.uk\u002Fwp-content\u002Fuploads\u002F2026\u002F11\u002Fmt-gox-hack-karpeles-vinnik.webp","2026-11-10T12:44:38+00:00","2026-11-10T15:00:19.650049+00:00",7,[17,20,22,25,28,30],{"name":18,"type":19},"Bitcoin","product",{"name":21,"type":19},"Bitcoin Cash",{"name":23,"type":24},"Mt. Gox","vendor",{"name":26,"type":27},"Alexey Bilyuchenko","threat_actor",{"name":29,"type":27},"Aleksandr Verner",{"name":31,"type":27},"Alexander Vinnik","2e06f76c-d5b9-4f54-9eef-4d3447b10730",{"id":32,"icon":34,"name":35,"slug":36},null,"Breaches","breaches",[38,40,45,50],{"category":39},{"id":32,"icon":34,"name":35,"slug":36},{"category":41},{"id":42,"icon":34,"name":43,"slug":44},"6cbdd207-aaa1-4176-9534-e156b125e917","Nation-state","nation-state",{"category":46},{"id":47,"icon":34,"name":48,"slug":49},"89f78b1c-3503-45a1-9fc7-e23d2ce1c6d5","Malware","malware",{"category":51},{"id":52,"icon":34,"name":53,"slug":54},"e7b231c8-5f79-4465-8d38-1ef13aea5a14","Threat Intelligence","threat-intelligence",[56],{"type":49,"value":57,"context":58},"Locky","Alexander Vinnik was convicted in Paris for laundering proceeds from the Locky malware.",[23,18,21],{"controls":61,"vendors":62},[],[],{"slug":64,"title":65,"body":66,"framework_refs":67,"framework_notes":72},"mt-gox-collapse-how-poor-access-controls-and-delayed-response-cost-850000-bitcoin","Mt. Gox Collapse: How Poor Access Controls and Delayed Response Cost 850,000 Bitcoin","The Mt. Gox breach, rooted in a 2011 hack, exposed catastrophic failures in access control and security architecture at the world's largest bitcoin exchange at the time. Attackers were able to exfiltrate hundreds of thousands of bitcoins over an extended period, suggesting that monitoring and detection controls were either absent or ignored. The delayed discovery and inadequate incident response allowed laundering operations to continue for years before legal action was taken. This case illustrates that custodians of high-value digital assets bear extraordinary responsibility to implement layered security controls, and that the consequences of failure can persist for over a decade — with victims still awaiting full repayment as of 2027.",[68,69,70,71],"CIS Control 6: Access Control Management (v8)","NIST CSF 2.0 DE.CM: Continuous Monitoring","NIST SP 800-53 IR-4: Incident Handling","NIS2 Article 21(2)(j)",{"NIS2 Article 21(2)(j)":73,"NIST SP 800-53 IR-4: Incident Handling":74,"NIST CSF 2.0 DE.CM: Continuous Monitoring":75,"CIS Control 6: Access Control Management (v8)":76},"Requiring multi-factor authentication and secured communications for administrative access to exchange systems would have made it significantly harder for attackers to gain and maintain unauthorized control.","A structured incident handling capability would have required Mt. Gox to contain, eradicate, and report the breach promptly rather than allowing the compromise to persist undetected for years.","Continuous monitoring of asset transactions and system activity would have detected the abnormal bitcoin outflows far earlier, reducing the total loss from the multi-year exfiltration.","This control requires that access to high-value assets be granted on a least-privilege basis with strong authentication, which would have limited the attacker's ability to move funds at scale from Mt. Gox wallets."]