[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"$fxi9cCIelC4QRxIfDhG-ZDKr4O-RP-rKNPveiRPpjs5I":3},{"lesson":4},{"id":5,"slug":6,"article_id":7,"title":8,"body":9,"prevention":10,"framework_refs":11,"status":24,"created_at":25,"published_at":26,"article":27,"tags":31,"podcasts":50},"3f394c83-a0c9-473a-9ab4-d0832f319cfe","gentlemen-ransomware-deploys-edr-killers-to-blind-defenses-before-attack","439b0243-3706-4783-a47b-ca38b74ca607","Gentlemen Ransomware Deploys EDR Killers to Blind Defenses Before Attack","The Gentlemen ransomware group exploits the Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique to load legitimate but vulnerable kernel drivers, escalating to kernel-level privileges and systematically disabling endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools across 48+ vendors. This approach renders the organization's primary last-line defense blind before ransomware payload deployment even begins. The use of multiple redundant EDR-killing tools (GentleKiller, HexKiller, ThrottleBlood, HavocKiller) demonstrates deliberate resilience against partial defenses, meaning no single security product can be relied upon alone. This matters because organizations that depend solely on EDR solutions have a critical single point of failure that sophisticated ransomware groups are actively engineering around.","**Immediate actions:**\n- Enroll in Microsoft's Vulnerable Driver Blocklist and enforce it via Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to prevent known BYOVD driver abuse.\n- Audit currently loaded kernel drivers across all endpoints and remove or block any drivers not explicitly required for business operations.\n- Enable tamper protection on all EDR\u002FAV solutions to prevent unauthorized process termination or service disruption.\n\n**Long-term improvements:**\n- Implement a defense-in-depth strategy layering EDR, network detection (NDR), SIEM, and deception technologies so that disabling one layer does not blind the entire security stack.\n- Maintain a strict application and driver allowlist using tools like WDAC or AppLocker to prevent unauthorized kernel-level code execution.\n- Establish a formal vulnerable driver management program that tracks CVEs associated with signed drivers and pushes blocklist updates on a defined cadence.\n\n**Detection measures:**\n- Deploy out-of-band monitoring (e.g., network flow analysis, cloud-delivered telemetry) that operates independently of host-based agents so kernel-level tampering does not eliminate all visibility.\n- Alert on any attempt to load, install, or execute drivers not present in your approved driver inventory, treating such events as high-severity incidents.\n- Integrate threat intelligence feeds covering RaaS tooling (e.g., GentleKiller variants) into your SIEM to detect known malicious driver hashes before execution.",[12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23],"CIS Control 2: Inventory and Control of Software Assets","CIS Control 10: Malware Defenses","CIS Control 13: Network Monitoring and Defense","NIST SP 800-53 SI-3: Malicious Code Protection","NIST SP 800-53 CM-7: Least Functionality","NIST SP 800-53 AU-9: Protection of Audit Information","NIST CSF DE.CM-4: Malicious Code Detection","NIST CSF PR.PT-3: Least Functionality Principle","MITRE ATT&CK T1562.001: Impair Defenses – Disable or Modify Tools","MITRE ATT&CK T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (BYOVD)","Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist (HVCI \u002F WDAC)","ITIL Change Management: Controlled Driver\u002FSoftware Deployment","published","2026-06-19T00:20:22.829614+00:00","2026-06-19T00:20:22.686+00:00",{"id":7,"url":28,"slug":29,"title":30},"https:\u002F\u002Fwww.bleepingcomputer.com\u002Fnews\u002Fsecurity\u002Fgentlemen-ransomware-uses-multiple-edr-killers-to-disable-defenses\u002F","gentlemen-ransomware-uses-multiple-edr-killers-to-disable-defenses-42866a","Gentlemen ransomware uses multiple EDR killers to disable defenses",[32,38,44],{"id":33,"name":34,"slug":35,"description":36,"color":37},"05757c8d-6b93-4194-b35d-7359e7d33b0e","Vulnerability Management","vulnerability-management","Missing scans, no risk prioritization","#fb923c",{"id":39,"name":40,"slug":41,"description":42,"color":43},"182e11d5-57c4-444e-8ec8-4682ad60261b","Incident Response","incident-response","Slow detection, poor containment, missing playbooks","#14b8a6",{"id":45,"name":46,"slug":47,"description":48,"color":49},"859cf0ad-a7e9-42bb-a75d-bac6511fa5d5","Configuration Management","configuration-management","Misconfigs, default credentials, exposed services","#eab308",[51],{"id":52,"date":53,"edition":54,"title":55,"audio_url":56},"7d05922c-ac57-48db-bd70-69a497221d90","2026-06-19","morning","ThreatNoir Morning Brief — June 19","https:\u002F\u002Fcdn.threatnoir.com\u002Fpodcasts\u002F2026-06-19\u002Fthreatnoir-morning-brief-2026-06-19.mp3"]