[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"framework:nist-800-53\u002Fsc-20":3},{"item":4,"lessons":18,"controls":68,"related":98},{"family":5,"item":6,"code":7,"title":8,"citations":9,"publisher":10,"summary_md":11,"official_text":12,"official_attribution":13,"official_url":14,"link_label":15,"note":16,"updated_at":17},"nist-800-53","sc-20","SC-20","Secure Name\u002FAddress Resolution Service (Authoritative Source)",15,"US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)","**What it asks for.** Authoritative name resolution services must provide data origin authentication and integrity verification artifacts with their responses, and support verification of chains of trust when operating as part of a distributed hierarchical namespace.\n\n**In practice.** This mostly means signing your authoritative DNS zones with DNSSEC and maintaining the chain of trust with the parent zone. Good practice includes managed key rollover, monitoring for signing failures and protection of DNS registrar and hosting accounts with strong authentication. Auditors look for DNSSEC validation results, key management procedures and registrar security settings.\n\n**Common gaps.** Many organisations have not enabled DNSSEC on their zones, or let signatures expire. Registrar accounts protected only by passwords remain a common route to domain hijacking.","a. Provide additional data origin authentication and integrity verification artifacts along with the authoritative name resolution data the system returns in response to external name\u002Faddress resolution queries; and\n  b. Provide the means to indicate the security status of child zones and (if the child supports secure resolution services) to enable verification of a chain of trust among parent and child domains, when operating as part of a distributed, hierarchical namespace.\nDiscussion: Providing authoritative source information enables external clients, including remote Internet clients, to obtain origin authentication and integrity verification assurances for the host\u002Fservice name to network address resolution information obtained through the service. Systems that provide name and address resolution services include domain name system (DNS) servers. Additional artifacts include DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) digital signatures and cryptographic keys. Authoritative data includes DNS resource records. The means for indicating the security status of child zones include the use of delegation signer resource records in the DNS. Systems that use technologies other than the DNS to map between host and service names and network addresses provide other means to assure the authenticity and integrity of response data.","From NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, a work of the US government in the public domain.","https:\u002F\u002Fcsrc.nist.gov\u002Fpubs\u002Fsp\u002F800\u002F53\u002Fr5\u002Fupd1\u002Ffinal","Open SP 800-53 at NIST",null,"2026-10-18T15:18:43.663+00:00",{"total":9,"list":19},[20,24,28,32,36,40,44,48,52,56,60,64],{"slug":21,"title":22,"published_at":23},"critical-rce-dns-wallet-theft-container-escape-self-healing-malware-highlight-diverse-threat-week","Critical RCE, DNS Wallet Theft, Container Escape & Self-Healing Malware Highlight Diverse Threat Week","2026-10-15T20:20:52.553+00:00",{"slug":25,"title":26,"published_at":27},"cctld-registry-breaches-enable-dns-hijacking-of-google-domains","ccTLD Registry Breaches Enable DNS Hijacking of Google Domains","2026-10-07T22:20:37.185+00:00",{"slug":29,"title":30,"published_at":31},"hijacked-country-code-registries-used-to-issue-fraudulent-tls-certificates","Hijacked Country-Code Registries Used to Issue Fraudulent TLS Certificates","2026-10-07T20:20:53.85+00:00",{"slug":33,"title":34,"published_at":35},"bind-9-flaws-allow-unauthenticated-dos-via-dns-over-https","BIND 9 Flaws Allow Unauthenticated DoS via DNS-over-HTTPS","2026-09-17T17:21:03.19+00:00",{"slug":37,"title":38,"published_at":39},"critical-bind-9-flaws-expose-dns-infrastructure-to-remote-dos-attacks","Critical BIND 9 Flaws Expose DNS Infrastructure to Remote DoS Attacks","2026-09-17T14:21:09.471+00:00",{"slug":41,"title":42,"published_at":43},"apt29-exploits-hotel-wi-fi-to-steal-microsoft-365-credentials","APT29 Exploits Hotel Wi-Fi to Steal Microsoft 365 Credentials","2026-08-04T02:20:43.002+00:00",{"slug":45,"title":46,"published_at":47},"multi-vector-threat-wave-ransomware-phishing-dns-hijacking-370-chrome-flaws","Multi-Vector Threat Wave: Ransomware, Phishing, DNS Hijacking & 370 Chrome Flaws","2026-07-30T18:21:48.071+00:00",{"slug":49,"title":50,"published_at":51},"ai-supercharges-dangling-dns-takeover-attacks-at-scale","AI Supercharges Dangling DNS Takeover Attacks at Scale","2026-07-30T14:20:44.918+00:00",{"slug":53,"title":54,"published_at":55},"dns-hijacking-exposes-cubepilot-via-domain-takeover-and-rogue-tls-certificates","DNS Hijacking Exposes CubePilot via Domain Takeover and Rogue TLS Certificates","2026-07-28T22:20:21.205+00:00",{"slug":57,"title":58,"published_at":59},"hotel-wi-fi-gateways-weaponized-to-steal-microsoft-365-credentials","Hotel Wi-Fi Gateways Weaponized to Steal Microsoft 365 Credentials","2026-07-27T16:21:48.626+00:00",{"slug":61,"title":62,"published_at":63},"public-wi-fi-gateway-compromise-used-to-steal-m365-credentials-via-dns-hijacking","Public Wi-Fi Gateway Compromise Used to Steal M365 Credentials via DNS Hijacking","2026-07-27T12:21:33.206+00:00",{"slug":65,"title":66,"published_at":67},"apt28-hijacks-hotel-wi-fi-dns-to-harvest-microsoft-365-credentials","APT28 Hijacks Hotel Wi-Fi DNS to Harvest Microsoft 365 Credentials","2026-07-24T18:20:23.686+00:00",[69,74,79,84,89,93],{"slug":70,"name":71,"problem":72,"stories":73},"dns-web-filtering","DNS filtering and secure web gateway","Users cannot reach known-malicious sites, and malware cannot phone home.",10,{"slug":75,"name":76,"problem":77,"stories":78},"phishing-resistant-mfa","Phishing-resistant MFA","A stolen password, or a user who taps Approve on a push prompt, is no longer enough to log in.",6,{"slug":80,"name":81,"problem":82,"stories":83},"endpoint-detection-response","Endpoint detection and response (EDR and XDR)","Malware and hands-on-keyboard attackers on laptops and servers get spotted and stopped.",5,{"slug":85,"name":86,"problem":87,"stories":88},"email-authentication","Email authentication (DMARC)","Nobody can send email that pretends to come from your domain.",4,{"slug":90,"name":91,"problem":92,"stories":88},"threat-intelligence","Threat intelligence","Attack campaigns reach your sector, suppliers or software before your team hears about them.",{"slug":94,"name":95,"problem":96,"stories":97},"patch-management","Automated patch management","Known holes get closed in days, not months.",3,[99,105,109,114,118,123,127,131],{"family":100,"item":101,"code":102,"title":103,"together":104},"cis","4","Control 4","Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software",9,{"family":100,"item":106,"code":107,"title":108,"together":104},"12","Control 12","Network Infrastructure Management",{"family":100,"item":110,"code":111,"title":112,"together":113},"13","Control 13","Network Monitoring and Defense",8,{"family":115,"item":116,"code":117,"title":117,"together":113},"itil","overview","ITIL",{"family":119,"item":120,"code":121,"title":122,"together":113},"gdpr","32","Article 32","Security of processing",{"family":100,"item":124,"code":125,"title":126,"together":78},"6","Control 6","Access Control Management",{"family":100,"item":128,"code":129,"title":130,"together":78},"9","Control 9","Email and Web Browser Protections",{"family":5,"item":132,"code":133,"title":134,"together":78},"si-3","SI-3","Malicious Code Protection"]