Back to Feed
MalwareSep 21, 2026

TASK#STOMP PowerShell Backdoor Steals Documents, Wi-Fi Passwords, and Clipboard Data

TASK#STOMP PowerShell backdoor steals documents, Wi-Fi passwords, and clipboard data.

Summary

A new campaign named TASK#STOMP utilizes a PowerShell backdoor to steal sensitive data including business documents, Wi-Fi passwords, and clipboard contents. The malware employs multiple persistence techniques, modifies timestamps, and uses redundant C2 servers to evade detection and complicate forensic analysis. Researchers suspect initial access may be via phishing or social engineering.

Full text

TASK#STOMP PowerShell Backdoor Steals Documents, Wi-Fi Passwords, and Clipboard Data Ravie LakshmananSep 21, 2026Endpoint Security / Malware Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of a new campaign dubbed TASK#STOMP that delivers a PowerShell backdoor designed to harvest sensitive data from compromised hosts. The backdoor "automatically harvests and exfiltrates business documents, watches the filesystem for new files in real time, steals Wi-Fi passwords and clipboard contents, takes screenshots, and accepts arbitrary remote commands through two redundant, token-authenticated C2 servers," Securonix researchers Akshay Gaikwad and Aaron Beardslee said in a report shared with The Hacker News. The starting point of the infection chain is the use of "wscript.exe" to execute an encoded Visual Basic Script (VBScript) file staged on the victim's desktop ("95c9050t66.vbs"). The exact initial access pathway used to deliver the payload is unclear, although it's possible that it may have been via email-based phishing or social engineering. By giving it a completely random file name, it's suspected that the intention may have been to evade file name-based detection mechanisms. The VBScript functions as the orchestrator for establishing persistence on the host using scheduled tasks and launching subsequent stages. The tasks are given the names Local Credential Manager, Network Audio Service, Windows Display Manager, and Device Credential Handler so as to blend in with regular operating system activity and avoid raising any red flags. The VBScript installer also sets up a backup persistence method that uses the Windows Startup folder to launch another script payload ("msdiag.vbs") every time the user logs in to the system. In the next phase, the malware executes PowerShell commands to forcibly terminate previously running instances and ensure there exists only one active session These strategies, paired with deliberate timestamp modification (aka timestomping), hidden execution, and cleanup behavior, suggest a deliberate effort to get around superficial administrative reviews and complicate forensic analysis. The use of redundant persistence methods guarantees continued execution even if one of them fails or is detected and removed. The next phase involves running a pair of hidden PowerShell commands - sys_loader.ps1, which decodes "diag_pack.dat" and initiates the document-stealing, surveillance, and remote-accesspayload to steal system metadata, business documents, Wi-Fi passwords, and clipboard content, monitor for newly modified files, take screenshots, and execute arbitrary PowerShell commandswin_conn.ps1, which decodes "win_conn_cfg.dat" and sets up a secondary, persistent C2 channel with command execution and collection capabilities "Running the modules as separate processes provides functional separation and operational redundancy: failure or termination of one branch does not immediately remove the other," Securonix said. Both the modules communicate with the same C2 infrastructure ("corecloudfileshare[.]xyz" or "attachmentsharingdrive[.]xyz"). Interestingly, the two components incorporate a mutual-watchdog relationship in which "diag_pack.dat" checks if "win_conn.ps1" is running, and restart it if not, and vice versa. The end goal of the attack is to provide a pathway for continuous document collection, credential and clipboard theft, screenshot capture, redundant C2 communications, and arbitrary code execution, while leveraging an array of techniques to fly under the radar. In the final stage, the VBScript orchestrator opens Google Chrome in a maximized window and opens a specific URL from "irantenders[.]com," which hosts a searchable database of all tenders and contracts issued by government departments and local authorities in Iran. The purpose behind this user-facing web action is unknown. Also launched is a batch script ("purge.bat") that invokes a two-second delay and likely performs a clean-up to erase traces of the malicious activity. That said, what this batch script does is unknown as its contents have not been recovered. "Threat actors routinely abuse Windows Script Host, PowerShell, Task Scheduler, and the .NET toolchain to blend malicious execution with legitimate administrative activity," the researchers said. "TASK#STOMP demonstrates this approach through a VBS-controlled framework that installs multiple persistence anchors and delegates follow-on functionality to PowerShell and dynamically compiled C# code. By relying almost entirely on native Windows components, the operation reduces its dependence on conventional executable payloads and makes individual events more difficult to distinguish from benign system activity." Found this article interesting? Follow us on Google News, Twitter and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post. SHARE     Tweet Share Share Share SHARE  data theft, endpoint security, Malware, Windows ⚡ Top Stories This Week Claude Opus 5 Helped Researchers Take Over OpenAI Staff Accounts via Chained Flaws Google Gemini Broke Into Real Company Systems After Security Test Domain Mix-Up OpenAI Reveals Six Model Incidents Involving Hidden Failures and Unauthorized Uploads Public Exploits Released for Four Linux Kernel Flaws That Enable Local Root New WordPress Click2Shell Flaw Forces Theme Installs, Can Chain to Code Execution Critical Check Point Management Flaw Lets Unauthenticated Attackers Run Code as Root ThreatsDay: Self-Rewriting Agents, 800+ Flaws Patched, Insider SIM Swaps and 22 More New Stories Critical Unbound DNSSEC Validator Flaw Could Allow RCE via a Malicious DNS Zone Cisco Warns of New Zero-Day ISE Auth Bypass (CVSS 10.0) Exploited in Active Attacks Three Threat Groups Target Russian Enterprises With Backdoors, Ransomware, and Wipers Attacker Hijacks AI Coding Assistant Session, Spreads Shai-Hulud Across About 100 Repositories Google Patches Pixel Modem Flaw Amid Signs of Limited Targeted Exploitation KREMLIN Banking Malware Hijacks Chrome and Edge to Steal Credentials and Session Tokens LiteSpeed Enterprise Flaw Could Let One Hosting Account Gain Root Access on a Shared Server China-Linked Hackers Exploit Chrome-Windows Zero-Day Chain to Deploy GRIMWEDGE Cisco Secure Email Gateway Flaw Exploited in the Wild, Enables Root Command Execution New DDRop Attack Breaks Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP Confidential Computing ⚡ Weekly Recap: Rogue AI Agents, WeChat Worm, PaperCut Attacks, AI Espionage, and Rootkits Twitch Browser Extension Leaks OAuth Tokens From Nearly 31,000 Users Attackers Use Passkey Phishing to Hijack Microsoft Cloud Accounts and Exfiltrate Data N0va Phishkit Targets US and EU Businesses: A New Challenge for Identity Security An Abandoned CDN Domain Was Re-Registered. Thousands of Sites Still Call It. How to Evaluate a Unified Security Platform Using a One-Incident Test Stop Trying to Control AI Behavior. Control What AI Can Reach ⭐ Featured Resources Validation Summit ’26: See How Pen Testing, Exposure Validation and BAS Work Together Red Teams: Learn How Attack Path Chaining Changes Automated Security Testing Turn Threat Intelligence Into Verified Risk With Threat-Led Penetration Testing Deploy Browser Security Monitoring in Minutes With a Single Header

Indicators of Compromise

  • domain — corecloudfileshare[.]xyz
  • domain — attachmentsharingdrive[.]xyz
  • domain — irantenders[.]com

Entities

TASK#STOMP (campaign)PowerShell (technology)VBScript (technology)Google Chrome (product)