Quantum computers could break today’s encryption. Washington needs to prepare now.

Summary

Quantum computers, harnessing quantum physics, could break today's encryption, compromising sensitive data globally. While AI safety is debated, the risk of quantum computing rendering encryption obsolete is immediate, with adversaries already employing 'harvest now, decrypt later' tactics. The US government is beginning a transition to post-quantum cryptography, but a broader, urgent effort is needed across federal agencies, states, localities, and critical infrastructure sectors.

Full text

The country is consumed right now with debating artificial intelligence and whether increasingly powerful AI systems could escape human control. Those are valid concerns, but lawmakers are overlooking another technological threat: quantum computing. Unlike AI safety debates, this risk could render today’s encryption obsolete – compromising everything from emails to financial transactions to government communications and military systems. Quantum computers harness unusual properties of quantum physics to solve certain problems far faster than conventional computers. That potential offers major scientific and economic advances. But a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could crack widely used forms of encryption protecting sensitive digital information globally. This threat differs from AI safety concerns. Quantum computers won’t develop goals or outsmart humans. The risk is simple: extraordinarily fast quantum machines could break the mathematical “locks” securing data. Researchers now believe breaking some encryption may require fewer resources than previously thought. This spring, Caltech spinout Oratomic published research suggesting a cryptographically relevant quantum computer could need dramatically fewer physical resources than earlier estimates. Google has accelerated its own preparations, setting 2029 as its target for transitioning to post-quantum cryptography. To use a rough analogy, researchers are increasingly asking whether a task once thought to require every lightbulb in Chicago might instead be accomplished with the power needed for one office building. If a company like Google, with some of the world’s deepest quantum and cryptographic expertise, is preparing for 2029, Congress should treat that deadline seriously. The federal government has begun responding. The National Security Agency has selected quantum-resistant algorithms for National Security Systems and is moving classified and other sensitive systems toward its CNSA 2.0 standards. In June, the White House accelerated the broader federal transition, directing high value federal systems to adopt post-quantum cryptography for key establishment by the end of 2030 and digital signatures by the end of 2031. But some dangers exist now. Foreign adversaries can steal encrypted information today, store it, and wait until they possess the computing power to decrypt it later. Cybersecurity experts call this “harvest now, decrypt later.” The White House identified that threat in its June order. Intelligence reports, military communications, corporate secrets, financial information, and other data that must remain private for years face risk long before a quantum computer capable of decrypting it exists. Congress has devoted enormous attention in recent years to AI and social media in recent years. The post-quantum cryptography transition demands equal urgency. Lawmakers must identify national vulnerabilities and coordinate the transition across all government agencies. The intelligence community should conduct a comprehensive assessment of its exposure to quantum decryption, building on the work at NSA. The Defense Department should assess military networks, satellites, communications systems, and critical infrastructure, ensuring future systems can upgrade encryption without replacing entire platforms. Navy and Space Force, which depend on secure communications and undersea cables carrying much of the world’s data, must be included. The transition cannot stop at the federal level. States and localities need resources to protect election systems. Hospitals, banks, utilities, communications networks, and critical infrastructure rely on technology that may need to remain secure for decades. Congress should help them identify vulnerable systems and begin upgrades before a crisis forces the issue, while funding the research to maintain U.S. technological superiority. No single technology will solve this permanently. Quantum-resistant encryption is essential, but the U.S. should develop additional security layers, including hardware-based protections and emerging physical or molecular authentication technologies. Defenses must evolve as computing power advances. China is not standing still. Through my work on the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, I have observed that America retains an enormous innovation advantage. However, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission has warned that Beijing is likely pursuing quantum capabilities that could threaten existing encryption. China’s 15th Five-Year Plan identifies quantum technology as a future industry, while three state-backed regional venture funds, totaling roughly $17.5 billion, include quantum among the strategic technologies they are intended to support. The amount specifically allocated to quantum has not been disclosed. Waiting would be a mistake, regardless of China’s current quantum progress. America has repeatedly recognized technological vulnerabilities too late. The nation was slow to understand how foreign adversaries could exploit social media and discovered critical computer system weaknesses only after foreign governments penetrated them. Congress should not repeat those mistakes. No one knows exactly when quantum computers will become powerful enough to break today’s encryption. That uncertainty is not a reason to wait. America’s strength has always been in our ability to invent new technologies, master them, and use them to protect our country. Congress should make sure we do that before our encryption becomes vulnerable, not after. Share Facebook LinkedIn Twitter Copy Link Add to Preferred Sources

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