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MITRE ATT&CK · T1111

Multi-Factor Authentication Interception

MITRE · cited in 5 of our lessons

Explanation

What attackers do. Attackers intercept or bypass multi-factor authentication, for example by capturing one-time codes through malware or proxy phishing pages, hijacking SMS, or abusing smart card access on a compromised host. This serves the Credential Access tactic.

How to defend. Use phishing-resistant MFA such as FIDO2 security keys or platform authenticators, and avoid SMS and voice codes for sensitive access. Protect endpoints from malware and monitor MFA registration and use. Make sure SIM swap protections are enabled with mobile carriers for staff in sensitive roles.

Signs to look for. Look for MFA codes used from locations different from the user's device, sign-ins immediately after visits to suspicious domains, SIM swap reports and new MFA methods registered. A common gap is treating any MFA as equal, when one-time codes can be relayed.

Open the technique on MITRE ATT&CK
The official text
Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than usernames and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. If a smart card is used for multi-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. Adversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes).

© The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation (MITRE ATT&CK®).

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